Is executive compensation a substitute governance mechanism to debt financing and leasing? by Minhat, M & Dzolkarnaini, N
1 
 
Is Executive Compensation a Substitute Governance 
Mechanism to Debt Financing and Leasing? 
 
 
 
 
Marizah Minhat 
School of Accounting, Financial Services and Law 
Edinburgh Napier University 
Craiglockhart Campus 
Edinburgh EH14 1DJ  
Scotland 
United Kingdom 
m.minhat@napier.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Nazam Dzolkarnaini* 
Salford Business School 
University of Salford 
Salford M5 4WT 
United Kingdom 
n.dzolkarnaini@salford.ac.uk 
 
 
 
(Applied Economics, forthcoming) 
 
 
JEL classification: G32, G34, J33, M52 
 
 
Keywords: Executive compensation, CEO pay, CEO incentives, Capital structure, 
Debt, Leasing, Corporate governance 
 
 
* Corresponding author 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Is Executive Compensation a Substitute Governance 
Mechanism to Debt Financing and Leasing? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This study examines whether and how CEO equity incentives relate to financing 
choices (i.e., debt and leases). Using manually collected CEO compensation and lease 
data for a sample of large UK firms, we found evidence of a negative relationship 
between CEO equity incentives and firm leverage. We also found that CEO equity 
incentives and leases are negatively related. The results are consistent with the theory 
introduced in this study on the substitutability of executive compensation and firm’s 
debt/lease financing. Our findings represent fresh empirical evidence and renewed 
interpretation regarding the relationship between executive equity-based incentives 
and firm’s financing choices. The substitutability theory we introduced here suggests 
that firms with greater use of debt and/or leases will implement less equity-based 
compensation in mitigating the agency cost of equity. 
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1. Introduction 
The agency cost of equity arises from the misalignment of interests between the 
managers of the firm and the shareholders of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
John and John, 1993). In the agency theory framework, managers are subject to self-
serving behaviours such as using corporate resources to pursue private benefits instead 
of investing in good investment projects. To mitigate the agency cost of equity, many 
corporate finance studies (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) have 
recognised the benefit of using debt in disciplining managers to be efficient in utilising 
corporate resources. Whereas, studies on executive compensation have identified the 
use of equity-based compensation to induce managers to invest in good investment 
projects instead of using such resources for their private benefits (e.g., Brick, Palmon 
and Wald, 2006; Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999; Kuang and Qin, 2009).  
 
Considering the two strands of studies, we can view that debt financing and equity-
based compensation as corporate governance substitutes to mitigate the agency cost 
of equity. If this two corporate governance mechanisms are substitutes, we can expect 
that firm will balance the use of debt financing with the use of equity-based 
compensation because each of them is expected to produce identical effect on the 
agency cost of equity. Apart from debt, lease is another fixed-claimed financing which 
can be viewed as another disciplinary mechanism to ensure managers use corporate 
resources more efficiently. Treating leases as playing a similar role to debt is 
consistent with the lease-debt substitutability theory (Beattie, Goodacre and Thomson, 
2000). Our study contributes by testing the substitutability of debt/leases and equity-
based compensation, which has not been documented in prior literature.  
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We use manually collected CEO compensation and lease data for a balanced panel of 
700 firm-year observations over a five-year period. It involves 140 firms in the United 
Kingdom for the period from 1999 to 2003. We find evidence of a negative 
relationship between CEO equity incentives and firm leverage. We also find that CEO 
equity incentives and leases are negatively related. The results are consistent with the 
theory introduced in this study on the substitutability of equity-based compensation 
and firm’s debt/lease financing. This theory suggests that firms with greater use of 
debt and/or leases to discipline managers will implement less equity-based 
compensation in mitigating the agency cost of equity. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The second section presents the 
development of the substitutability theory and hypotheses. The description of the data 
and the definition of variables are presented in the third section. The empirical results 
of the study are presented in the fourth section. Finally, the last section presents the 
conclusions. 
 
2. The Development of Substitutability Theory and Hypotheses  
2.1. Debt as a Disciplinary Mechanism for Interest Alignment 
The presence of agency costs which arise from the separation of ownership and control 
is widely acknowledged in the corporate finance literature. The agency theory predicts 
that managers of the firm will have a tendency to use corporate resources for private 
benefits instead of investing them in good investment projects. The detrimental effect 
of managerial self-serving behaviour has been documented in many studies. For 
example, Yermack (2006) finds that the average shareholder returns of firms that have 
disclosed their CEO’s personal use of corporate jets, underperformed market 
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benchmarks by more than 4% annually. Around the date of the initial disclosure, the 
firms’ stock prices dropped by an average of 1.1%. 
 
The agency theory also acknowledges the benefit of debt in mitigating the conflict of 
interests between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Further, 
Jensen’s (1986) controlling hypothesis suggests that the use of debt will reduce the 
agency cost of free cash flows by reducing the cash flow available for spending at the 
discretion of managers hence reduce the opportunity for self-serving managers to 
abuse such corporate resources. By issuing debt, managers are bonded to their 
promises to pay out future cash flows in a way that cannot be accomplished by 
dividend as in the case of equity financing. Failure to fulfil such promises in the form 
of interest payments and principal repayment will lead to bankruptcy hence managers 
will lose their jobs. Therefore, the presence of debt will discipline the managers to use 
corporate resources more appropriately and efficiently. 
 
2.2. Executive Compensation as an Incentive Mechanism for Interest Alignment 
The agency theory also predicts that the agency costs of equity caused by managerial 
self-serving behaviour can be mitigated by linking managerial compensation with 
shareholder wealth through equity-based pay (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990). Consistent with this theory, empirical studies on executive 
compensation have shown that manager-shareholder interest alignment (i.e., positive 
pay-for-performance sensitivity) is strengthened when a greater proportion of equity-
based schemes are used in executive pay packages (Hall and Liebman, 1998; Murphy, 
1999).  
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The equity-based pay refer to the granting of stock and stock options to the CEOs 
(Hall and Liebman, 1998). Managers awarded with stock options will be more 
motivated to invest in positive net present value projects, instead of using corporate 
resources for private benefits, with a view to increase the firm’s stock price. The 
managers will then be able to profitably exercise the stock options by buying the firm’s 
shares at the exercise price, which is lower than the prevailing market price in the case 
of rising stock price. The same incentive effect can be expected in the case of stock 
grants because stock grants can be viewed as stock options with zero exercise price. 
Since the values of both stock options and stock grants are positively related to stock 
price, managers will be encouraged to alleviate inefficient use of resources that could 
be detrimental to firm performance. 
 
2.3. The Substitutability of Debt Financing and Leasing 
In the traditional leasing theory, lease financing is recognised as a common mechanism 
for reducing the agency costs of debt (e.g., Mehran, Taggart and Yermack, 1999; 
Krishnan and Moyer, 1994; Smith and Warner, 1979; Stulz and Johnson, 1985). Some 
studies argued that firm risk is lower when assets are financed using leases rather than 
debt. For instance, a firm that purchases an asset must engage in a potentially costly 
disposal when the asset becomes obsolete and must simultaneously pay off the debt 
financing that was previously obtained to purchase the asset. If the firm leases the asset 
instead, the firm will not bear the obsolescence risk as well as the asset-specific risks 
as the risks are shifted to the lessors. By implication, leasing can reduce a firm’s risk 
hence protecting its debt value. Therefore, debtholders will have a greater incentive to 
induce firms to take on more leases as in the case of debt-leasing complementary (e.g., 
Adams and Hardwick, 1998).  
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However, although leasing can reduce a firm’s risk hence protecting its debt value, 
both leases and debt entail a commitment to a set of fixed payments. Because of this 
feature, the lease-debt substitutability theory recognises lease as a substitute of debt 
(e.g., Beattie, Goodacre and Thomson, 2000; Mehran, Taggart and Yermack, 1999). 
By examining 410 firms that do not engage in leasing and 98 firms with finance leases 
on their balance sheets over the 1984-1986 period, Krishnan and Moyer (1994) 
document a significant negative relationship between lease ratios and debt ratios. 
Similar findings are documented by Adedeji and Stapleton (1996), who examine a 
sample of UK firms for the period from 1990 to 1992. The findings of these studies 
are consistent with the lease-debt substitutability theory.  
 
2.4. The Substitutability of Executive Compensation and Debt/Leases for Interest 
Alignment 
The substitutability of executive compensation and debt/leases as corporate 
governance mechanisms in mitigating the agency cost of equity has not been 
documented in prior compensation and capital structure studies [e.g., (Ertugrul and 
Hegde (2008); John, Mehran and Qian (2010); Ortiz-Molina (2007); Robicheaux, Fu 
and Ligon (2008)]. Zhang (2009) explores the substitutability of debt and equity-based 
compensation without incorporating the substitutability effect of leases. The 
substitutability of leases was also not explored in John and John (1993). Building upon 
the agency theory, we argue that debt/leasing contracts and equity-based 
compensation can be viewed as disciplinary and incentives mechanisms, respectively, 
for managers to use corporate resources more efficiently hence improve firm 
performance. These governance mechanisms can substitute each other. This implies 
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that firm can resort to equity-based compensation if debt and/or leases are not available 
to reduce the agency cost of equity. The substitutability theory introduced here leads 
to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. There is a negative relationship between CEO equity incentives and 
debt. 
Hypothesis 2. There is a negative relationship between CEO equity incentives 
and leases. 
 
3. Data 
To test the hypotheses regarding the relationship between CEO equity incentives and 
debt, and CEO equity incentives and leases, we selected a sample from FTSE350 
firms. The exclusion of financial firms is a common practice and we adopt this 
approach to maintain comparability with other studies (e.g., Ertugrul and Hegde, 2008; 
Ortiz-Molina, 2007). Following Ortiz-Molina (2007), firms without enough historical 
data (due to reasons such as takeover/listed and data non-availability) were excluded 
from the sample. This process has produced a balanced panel data of 700 firm-year 
observations over a five-year period (i.e., 140 firms for the period from 1999 to 2003). 
Panel A of Table 1 summarises the sample selection process.  
 
    ---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
       ---------------------------------------- 
 
Panel B of Table 1 shows the industry distribution of sample firms. Firms are classified 
into a number of industries according to the Primary Standard Industrial Classification 
Codes that are obtained from the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database. 
Overall, the sample firms represent several industrial sectors. The largest number of 
firms (59 firms) belongs to the manufacturing sector, followed by the wholesale and 
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retail trade sector (23 firms) and the construction sector (14 firms). Both CEO pay and 
operating lease data are manually collected from the annual reports of the firms.  
 
3.1. CEO Equity Incentives   
CEO equity incentives is the dependent variable in our regressions. Following 
Conyon, Core and Guay (2011), we measure equity incentives (i.e., pay-for-
performance sensitivity) as (share price) × (the number of shares held) + (share price) 
× (option delta) × (the number of options held). This incentive measure is a scaled 
version (i.e., multiplied by 100) of a commonly used incentive measure: the dollar 
change in a CEO’s wealth from a 1% stock price increase (Conyon, Core and Guay, 
2011).  
 
3.2. Leverage and Leasing   
Following many studies (e.g., Beattie, Goodacre and Thomson, 2000; Graham, 
Lemmon and Schallheim, 1998; Ortiz-Molina, 2007), we measure leverage by the 
book value of long-term debt (net of finance leases) divided by the adjusted book value 
of a firm. The adjusted book value of a firm equals the book value of total assets minus 
the book value of equity plus the market value of equity plus the present value of 
operating lease assets. Note that this value is adjusted to include the effect of operating 
leases, which are not reported on the balance sheet. Although the finance lease figures 
are available from the annual reports of the firms, the figures for operating lease assets 
and liability are estimated using the constructive capitalisation method (Beattie, 
Edwards and Goodacre, 1998). To ensure robustness, we define market leverage as 
the book value of long-term debt (net of finance leases) divided by the adjusted market 
value of a firm. Prior studies have commonly separated leasing measures into finance 
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and operating lease measures (e.g., Robicheaux, Fu and Ligon, 2008). Similar to debt, 
the long-term portion of leases are used and measured against a firm’s adjusted book 
value (and the market value for robustness checks).  
 
3.3. Other Variables  
The following variables are included in the regression model: firm size, growth 
opportunities, board composition, CEO ownership and tenure. Firm size is the natural 
logarithm of sales for a year. Sales are a common measure of firm size (e.g., Brick, 
Palmon and Wald, 2006). Growth opportunities are measured by the adjusted market-
to-book ratio (Adam and Goyal, 2008; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; Ortiz-Molina, 2007). 
Other corporate governance variables are measured by the number of executive 
directors divided by the number of non-executive directors, the percentage of a firm’s 
common stock owned by CEO (Brick, Palmon and Wald,  2006), and the number of 
years that the CEO has held the position of CEO at a firm. The definitions of the 
variables are presented in the appendix. 
 
4. Empirical Tests and Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
We find that 79% of the firm-years award stock options and/or stock grants to their 
CEOs during 1999-2003. The mean (median) value of CEO equity incentives is £9.5 
million (£1.3 million). This figure is comparable to the mean (median) of £13.5 million 
(£2.3 million) reported in Conyon, Core and Guay (2011) for the year 2003.      
 
    ---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
       ---------------------------------------- 
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The mean values for the finance and operating lease ratios, based on the adjusted book 
value, are 1% and 8%, respectively. These figures are broadly similar with those that 
have been reported in the US (Graham, Lemmon and Schallheim, 1998). The mean 
value for book leverage is 19%. These figures are lower than those that have been 
reported in the US (24%) (Ortiz-Molina, 2007). As reported in previous studies, the 
indebtedness level of UK firms is relatively lower than that of US firms (e.g., de Jong, 
Kabir and Nguyen, 2008).  
 
Sales, which constitute a measure of firm size, have a mean (median) value of £3.6 
billion (£1.3 billion). As a measure of growth opportunities, the market-to-book ratio 
has a mean (median) value of 2.06 (1.43). The average CEO has been employed as a 
CEO of his or her firm for six years. Similar to the work of Kuang and Qin (2009), we 
find that the average board has 10 members with equal proportions of executive and 
non-executive directors. The correlation analysis show that the correlation coefficients 
for the key variables that are used in our analysis are small.  
 
Figure 1 presents the scatter diagrams for the key explanatory variables, which are 
debt, finance lease and operating lease. It can be observed that debt (DRM) and finance 
lease (FLRM) are positively correlated. This implies that firms that are strongly debt 
financed also make use of finance lease and vice versa. In an unreported correlation, 
the correlation coefficient between DRM and FLRM is 0.4125 (p-value < 0.01). This 
observation is consistent with debt-leasing complementary theory that we have 
discussed in Section 2.3 earlier.  
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The scatter diagram indicate no correlation between debt (DRM) and operating lease 
(OLRM). The correlation coefficient is -0.0607 (p-value < 0.01), which is not 
statistically significant. This implies that neither debt-leasing complementary theory 
nor debt-leasing substitutability theory can be applied. We also observe no correlation 
between finance lease (FLRM) and operating lease (OLRM). 
 
4.2. Regression Results 
The relationship between leverage and CEO equity incentives is first examined 
without controlling for the effect of leasing to ensure a better comparison with 
previous studies. Tobit, OLS and fixed effects estimates are used, and the results are 
presented in Table 3. Following Ertugrul and Hegde (2008), we use a Tobit regression 
because of the presence of substantial cases of zero-valued CEO equity incentives. 
The fixed effects estimates are preferred over the random effects estimates based on 
the results of Hausman test.1  
 
    ---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
       ---------------------------------------- 
 
The dependent variable is CEO equity incentives (INCENT). Consistent with our first 
hypothesis, Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 show that book leverage (DRB) is negatively 
related to CEO equity incentives. The relationship is even stronger when market 
leverage (DRM) is used, as reported in Columns 3, 4 and 5. The negative relationship 
between firm leverage and CEO equity incentives is consistent with previous findings 
(e.g., Ortiz-Molina, 2007). These results are also consistent with our first hypothesis 
that suggest the substitutability of equity incentives and debt.      
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We then examine the relationship between finance leases and CEO equity incentives 
without controlling for the effect of leverage. As reported in Columns 1, 2 and 3 of 
Table 4, the regression specifications produce consistent results that suggest market 
measure of finance leases (FLRM) is negatively related to CEO equity incentives. The 
study of Robicheaux, Fu and Ligon (2008) presents similar results. The results for 
operating leases are reported in Columns 4, 5 and 6. As shown in Column 6, operating 
lease, as measured by its market value (i.e., OLRM), is also negatively related to CEO 
equity incentives. Overall, there is strong evidence to suggest the substitutability of 
equity incentives and leases. The negative coefficients on OLRM shown in Columns 
4 and 5 are also consistent with this hypothesis, although the coefficients are not 
statistically significant.   
 
    ---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
       ---------------------------------------- 
 
For the coefficient on FLRM, all three specifications (Columns 1 to 3) yield significant 
estimate, though the FE estimate (-10.7323***) is smaller in magnitude than the 
estimates of tobit (-17.2745***) and OLS (-16.9312***). Columns 4 and 5 report that 
the coefficients on OLRM as statistically insignificant whereas the FE estimate in 
column 6 produces a significantly large coefficient (-7.5342**). The results reported 
in Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 of Table 4 have to be interpreted more cautiously because 
the estimates were produced by tobit and OLS, which disregard the space and time 
dimensions of the pooled data (Gujarati, 2003). The estimates produced by FE 
(Columns 3 and 6) are viewed as more appropriate given the fact that we are dealing 
with panel data (Baltagi, 2005). We thus employ FE in our further analysis.   
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We further examine our first hypothesis by controlling for the effect of leasing. The 
second hypothesis is also tested by controlling for the effect of leverage. The results 
are reported in Table 5. As reported in Columns 1 through 3, leverage (DRM) is 
negatively related to CEO equity incentives. Columns 1 and 3 report the negative 
relationship between finance leases (FLRM) and CEO equity incentives after we have 
controlled for leverage. Column 2 and 3 report the negative relationship between 
operating leases (OLRM) and CEO equity incentives after we have controlled for 
leverage. Taken together, these results are consistent with the substitutability theory 
we introduced in this study. 
 
    ---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
       ---------------------------------------- 
 
The substitutability theory suggests that firms with greater use of debt and/or leases 
will implement less equity incentives in alleviating agency cost. If firms have a choice 
between debt and lease financing, the regression results in Column (3) of Table 5 
indicate finance lease as a stronger substitute for CEO equity incentives. This is 
reflected through the coefficient on FLRM (i.e., -8.3424**), which is greater than the 
coefficients on DRM (i.e., -2.7048**) and OLRM (i.e., -7.1018**). 
 
Nevertheless, we have previously gathered from Figure 1 that finance lease (FLRM) 
and debt (DRM) are positively correlated. This implies that firms that are strongly debt 
financed also make use of finance lease and vice versa. We then estimate a model with 
interaction (i.e., DRM*FLRM) to test the ability of the simultaneous presence of debt 
and finance lease to substitute equity-based pay. The results reported in Column 4 of 
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Table 5 show that the presence of finance lease to complement debt has form a stronger 
substitutability effect than debt alone.  
 
If firms that are strongly debt financed make use of finance lease too as suggested by 
the debt-leasing complementary theory, they will gain even greater substitutability 
effect by taking on operating lease. Consistent with this notion, Column 4 shows that 
the simultaneous presence of both debt and operating lease serves as the strongest 
substitute for CEO equity incentives. This is evidenced by the coefficient on 
DRM*OLRM (-34.4125**), which is of greater magnitude than the coefficient on 
DRM*FLRM (-16.0001**) that does not incorporate operating lease.  
 
Our regression results also report significant relations between several important 
variables and CEO equity incentives. There is a significant positive relation between 
growth opportunities (MTB) and CEO equity incentives. As suggested by Yermack 
(1995), firms with greater growth opportunities tend to have a higher degree of 
information asymmetry; hence, such firms experience difficulties in monitoring and 
evaluating the success of managers in choosing among investments. This scenario 
suggests that a greater use of equity incentives may assist in ensuring the alignment of 
manager and shareholder interests. Significant positive relations between CEO equity 
incentives and CEO ownership (CEOWN), as well as tenure (CEOTEN), are expected 
because these two governance variables can ascertain better alignment of interests 
with shareholders.    
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5. Conclusions 
This paper introduces a theory that suggests the substitutability of equity incentives 
and debt/lease financing. This theory is built upon the agency theory that has 
acknowledged equity- based compensation and fixed claim financing (i.e., debt and 
leasing) as corporate governance mechanisms to discipline or incentivise managers to 
use corporate resources more efficiently. The presence of debt/lease commitments will 
get the managers to avoid wastage and spend corporate resources efficiently so that 
the financial commitments can be met, otherwise they risk losing their jobs and 
reputation should the firm goes into liquidation resulting from default repayments. 
Awarding managers with equity incentives will also discourage managers to use 
corporate resources for private benefits, and they will instead invest in projects with 
positive net present values with an expectation to increase the firm’s share price hence 
the value of their equity-based compensation.  
 
Prior studies have acknowledged lease-debt substitutability, and therefore, our study 
contributes by introducing the substitutability of equity-based compensation and 
debt/lease financing. To our knowledge, empirical investigation along the 
substitutability of leases and equity-based compensation is currently non-existent 
perhaps due to the absence of a database that can provide comprehensive data on both 
operating leases and equity-based compensation. Although the data on finance leases 
were available from the balance sheets of the firms, the data on operating leases and 
equity-based compensation used in this study were hand-collected. This laborious 
process has resulted in the final sample consists of 700 firm-year observations over a 
five-year period (i.e., 140 firms for the period from 1999 to 2003).  
 
 17 
Overall, our findings are consistent with the substitutability theory that suggests firms 
with greater use of debt and/or leases will implement less equity incentives in 
alleviating managerial self-serving behaviour. This is evidenced by the negative 
relationship between CEO equity incentives and leverage, and CEO equity incentives 
and leases. Essentially, our findings represent fresh empirical evidence and renewed 
interpretation regarding the relationship between executive equity-based incentives 
and firm’s financing choices. This is a useful insight to enrich our understanding of 
the interactions among alternative corporate governance mechanisms to reduce the 
agency cost of equity.   
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Footnote 
1 Although Baltagi (2005, p.19) argues that choosing between the fixed effects and 
random effects estimations “is not as easy a choice as it might seem”, a formal 
Hausman specification test for fixed versus random effects panel estimation is able to 
identify the estimation method that is suitable for each case in terms of the underlying 
assumption regarding the error term. The test’s null hypothesis is that the difference 
in coefficients is not systematic (or random). The random effects estimate is preferred 
if the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
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Appendix 
 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Name Definitions  
CEO equity incentives (INCENT) (Share price) × (the number of shares held) + (share price) × (option 
delta) × (the number of options held). This incentive measure is a 
scaled version (i.e., multiplied by 100) of a commonly used incentive 
measure: a dollar change in a CEO’s wealth from a 1% stock price 
increase (Conyon, Core and Guay, 2011). 
 
Book leverage (DRB) Book value of long-term debt (net of finance leases) divided by the 
adjusted book value of a firm. 
 
Market leverage (DRM) Book value of long-term debt (net of finance leases) divided by the 
adjusted market value of a firm. 
 
Finance lease  Finance leases divided by the adjusted book value of a firm (FLRB); 
finance leases divided by the adjusted market value of a firm (FLRM).   
  
Operating lease  Operating leases divided by the adjusted book value of a firm 
(OLRB); operating leases divided by the adjusted market value of a 
firm (OLRM).   
  
Firm characteristics  
Size The natural logarithm of sales. 
 
Stock return The natural logarithm of the annual change of a firm’s return index. 
 
Growth opportunities (MTB) The ratio of the adjusted market value to the adjusted book value. 
 
Adjusted market value (£b) The book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the 
market value of equity plus the present value of operating lease assets. 
 
Adjusted book value (£b) The book value of total assets plus the present value of operating lease 
assets. 
 
CEO stockholding (CEOWN) The percentage of a firm’s common stock that is owned by its CEO. 
 
CEO tenure (CEOTEN) The natural logarithm of the number of years that a CEO has held the 
position of CEO at a firm. 
 
Executive directors (EXEC) The number of executive directors divided by the number of non-
executive directors. 
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Figure 1 
 
Scatter Diagrams of Leverage (DRM), Finance Lease (FLRM) and Operating 
Lease (OLRM)  
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Table 1 
Selection of Sample Firms 
 
Panel A. Sample selection 
 
Number of non-financial FTSE350 firms 251 
Firms with unavailable data for at least one year for the 
following reasons:  
 - takeover/delisted  (69) 
 - annual report not available  (31) 
 - required data in Datastream not available (11) 
Total number of sample firms  140 
 
 
Panel B. Industry classification 
 
Industry Number of firms Percentage 
 
Mining 
 
4 
 
3% 
Manufacturing 59 42% 
Construction 14 10% 
Wholesale and Retail 23 16% 
Transportation and Communication 13 9% 
Utilities 8 6% 
Other 19 14% 
Total 140 100% 
 
 
 
The sample consists of 140 non-financial UK firms during the 1999-2003 period. Firms are classified into 
different industries using the UK Primary Standard Industrial Classification Codes from the Financial Analysis 
Made Easy (FAME) database. 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
            
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent variable      
CEO equity incentives (INCENT) (£m) 9.4986 1.2677 31.4099 0.0000 323.3405 
Financing variables      
Long-term debt / adjusted book value (DRB) 0.1884 0.1587 0.1532 0.0000 1.1654 
Long-term debt / adjusted market value (DRM) 0.1330 0.1040 0.1227 0.0000 0.8188 
Long-term finance lease liability / adjusted book value (FLRB) 0.0082 0.0004 0.0267 0.0000 0.2918 
Long-term finance lease liability / adjusted market value (FLRM) 0.0072 0.0025 0.0274 0.0000 0.3039 
Long-term operating lease liability / adjusted book value (OLRB) 0.0810 0.0403 0.1129 0.0000 0.7821 
Long-term operating lease liability / adjusted market value (OLRM) 0.0522 0.0236 0.0780 0.0000 0.4638 
Long-term debt (£b) 0.8848 0.2478 1.8897 0.0000 18.7750 
Long-term finance lease liability (£b) 0.0466 0.0001 0.2107 0.0000 2.4300 
Long-term operating lease liability (£b) 0.2363 0.0610 0.4345 0.0000 3.4315 
Adjusted book value (£b) 5.2139 1.4848 15.3297 0.0427 172.6844 
Adjusted market value (£b) 7.8846 2.3508 20.1047 0.1330 227.3096 
Firm characteristic variables      
Sales (£b) 3.6276 1.3274 10.1214 0.0177 141.3427 
Growth opportunities (MTB) 2.0629 1.4281 3.7571 0.5402 83.5721 
Control variables      
CEO stockholding (CEOWN) 0.0111 0.0003 0.0441 0.0000 0.3624 
Executive directors (EXEC) 0.9950 0.8819 0.5633 0.1000 4.0000 
CEO tenure (years) (CEOTEN) 5.8664 4.0000 5.3477 0.5000 33.0000 
The sample consists of 140 FTSE350 firms during the 1999-2003 period (700 firm-year observations). All variables are defined in 
the appendix. 
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Table 3 
Debt and CEO Equity Incentives 
  
 
  
 
      
 (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) (5) 
Independent variable Tobit  OLS 
 
Tobit OLS FE 
DRB -0.7128* -0.6915* 
 
   
 (-1.70) (-1.70) 
 
   
DRM   
 
-2.8481*** -2.8253*** -2.9749*** 
   
 
(-5.33) (-5.36) (-2.66) 
SIZE 0.3146*** 0.3151*** 
 
0.3091*** 0.3096*** 0.3062 
 (6.68) (6.81) 
 
(6.68) (6.88) (1.24) 
MTB 0.0778*** 0.0779** 
 
0.0667*** 0.0669*** 0.0573** 
 (4.56) (2.33) 
 
(3.95) (2.47) (2.26) 
CEOWN 19.6657*** 19.6416*** 
 
19.0249*** 19.0049*** 28.3652*** 
 (12.46)    (9.87)    
 
(12.23)    (9.65)    (3.85)    
CEOTEN 0.4331***  0.4310***  
 
0.4330***  0.4309***  0.2430***  
 (6.82)    (6.54)    
 
(6.95)    (6.65)    (2.87)    
EXEC -0.2440**   -0.2433*   
 
-0.2861**   -0.2856**   0.1088   
 (-1.95) (-1.71) 
 
(-2.33) (-2.01) (0.56) 
CONSTANT 0.8847 0.8806 
 
1.4969** 1.4938* 1.9937 
 (1.19)    (1.14)    
 
(2.04)    (1.96)    (0.57)    
Pseudo R2 0.1128  
 
0.1213   
Adjusted R2  0.3725 
 
 0.3951  
R2 overall   
 
  0.3179 
Hausman test FE vs. RE (χ2)   
 
  17.72 
The sample consists of 140 FTSE350 firms during the 1999-2003 period (700 firm-year observations). The 
dependent variable is CEO equity incentives. Both year and industry dummies are included in the Tobit and 
OLS estimates, whereas only a year dummy is included in the fixed effects estimates. The coefficients for year 
and industry dummies are not reported for reasons of brevity. All variables are defined in the appendix. White's 
heteroscedastic-consistent covariance matrix estimation (1980) is used to correct for heteroscedasticity in the 
OLS estimates. t-statistics are reported in parentheses for the Tobit, OLS and fixed effects estimates. Pseudo 
R2 values are reported in the Tobit estimates, whereas adjusted R2 values are reported in the OLS estimates. 
For the panel data regressions, fixed effects estimates are preferred over random effects estimates based on the 
Hausman test. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (two-
tailed test). 
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Table 4  
Finance Leases, Operating Leases and CEO Equity Incentives 
  
  
  
 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent 
variable Tobit  OLS FE Tobit OLS FE 
FLRM -17.2745*** -16.9312*** -10.7323***    
 (-6.86)    (-10.52)    (-3.00)       
OLRM    -0.4466 -0.4086 -7.5342** 
    (-0.48) (-0.43) (-2.15) 
SIZE 0.3103*** 0.3105*** 0.1905 0.3148*** 0.3153*** 0.1727 
 (6.79) (6.83) (0.73) (6.67) (6.80) (0.67) 
MTB 0.0756*** 0.0758** 0.0584** 0.0795*** 0.0797** 0.0526** 
 (4.59) (2.43) (2.18) (4.65) (2.37) (2.14) 
CEOWN 19.7670*** 19.7401*** 28.5936*** 19.8674*** 19.8312*** 27.1860*** 
 (12.92)    (10.14)    (3.90)    (12.45) (9.64) (4.18) 
CEOTEN 0.4419*** 0.4400*** 0.2453*** 0.4389*** 0.4365*** 0.2448*** 
 (7.18)    (6.73)    (2.87)    (6.87) (6.45) (2.87) 
EXEC -0.2461** -0.2458* 0.1036 -0.2205* -0.2203 0.0620 
 (-2.04) (-1.72) (0.54) (1.77) (1.30) (0.32) 
CONSTANT 1.7834** 1.7767** 3.3524 0.6471 0.6493 3.9457 
 (2.46)    (2.5)    (0.92)    (0.89) (0.83) (1.07) 
Pseudo R2 0.1273   0.1119   
Adjusted R2  0.4100 0.4193  0.3702  
R2 overall   0.3176   0.2146 
Hausman test FE 
vs. RE (χ2)   19.08   19.08 
The sample consists of 140 FTSE350 firms during the 1999-2003 period (700 firm-year observations). The dependent variable 
is CEO equity incentives. Both year and industry dummies are included in the Tobit and OLS estimates, whereas only a year 
dummy is included in the fixed effects estimates. The coefficients for year and industry dummies are not reported for reasons 
of brevity. All variables are defined in the appendix. White's heteroscedastic-consistent covariance matrix estimation (1980) 
is used to correct for heteroscedasticity in the OLS estimates. t-statistics are reported in parentheses for the Tobit, OLS and 
fixed effects estimates. Pseudo R2 values are reported in the Tobit estimates, whereas adjusted R2 values are reported in the 
OLS estimates. For the panel data regressions, fixed effects estimates are preferred over random effects estimates based on the 
Hausman test. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
  
  30 
Table 5 
Debt, Leases and CEO Equity Incentives 
  
 
  
 
      
  (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) 
Independent variable  FE 
 
FE FE FE 
DRM  -2.8435** 
 
-2.8242** -2.7048** -0.7997 
  (-2.52) 
 
(-2.60) (-2.46) (-0.66) 
FLRM  -9.0226** 
 
 -8.3424**  
  (-2.39) 
 
 (-2.22)  
OLRM   
 
-7.2081** -7.1018**  
   
 
(-2.19) (-2.13)  
DRM*FLRM   
 
  -16.0001** 
   
 
  (-2.17) 
DRM*OLRM   
 
  -34.4125** 
   
 
  (-2.20) 
SIZE  0.2913 
 
0.2722 0.2589 0.2029 
  (1.20) 
 
(1.12) (1.08) (0.83) 
MTB  0.0572** 
 
0.0517** 0.0516** 0.0564** 
  (2.25)    
 
(2.20)    (2.19)    (2.22)    
CEOWN  28.3111***   
 
26.9572***   26.9280***   26.7132***   
  (3.84) 
 
(4.10) (4.10) (4.23) 
CEOTEN  0.2426*** 
 
0.2420*** 0.2416*** 0.2528*** 
  (2.86)    
 
(2.86)    (2.85)    (3.01)    
EXEC  0.1037 
 
0.0633 0.0593 0.0867 
  (0.53) 
 
(0.33) (0.31) (0.45) 
CONSTANT  2.2554 
 
2.8596 3.0888 3.4148 
  (0.66)    
 
(0.83)    (0.91)    (0.99)    
Pseudo R2   
 
   
Adjusted R2   
 
   
R2 overall  0.3413 
 
0.2630 0.2286 0.3032 
Hausman test FE vs. RE (χ2)  18.32 
 
27.71 28.72 32.78 
The sample consists of 140 FTSE350 firms during the 1999-2003 period (700 firm-year observations). The 
dependent variable is CEO equity incentives. All variables are defined in the appendix. t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. The coefficients for year dummies are not reported for reasons of brevity. Fixed effects estimates 
are preferred over random effects estimates based on the Hausman test. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
 
 
